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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States, Canada, and Mexico entered into the
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(Agreement) in response to the concerns of U.S. environmental-
ists that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
would adversely impact the NAFTA member countries' environ-
mental laws and their enforcement. 2 The Agreement created the
North American Commission on Environmental Cooperation
(Commission), which is responsible for ensuring that the three
countries comply with the Agreement.3 The Agreement provides
individuals and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) with the
right to present submissions to the Commission Secretariat to
declare that one of the NAFTA countries is failing to effectively
enforce its domestic environmental laws. 4  This Comment dis-
cusses an NGO submission, the Cozumel Pier Submission
(Cozumel). Cozumel is the first NGO submission in which the
Commission will compile a factual record.5 This Comment ana-
lyzes Cozumel with a focus on the ability of the Commission's
procedural mechanisms to effectively review citizen submis-
sions.6
2. The North American Free Trade Agreement became effective on January 1,
1994. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M.
605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
3. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, opened for signa-
ture Sept. 9, 1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 10(1)(a), 32 I.L.M. 1480, 1485 (1993) [hereinafter
Agreement].
4. Id. art. 14.
5. The Secretariat, in deciding whether it would be proper to compile a factual rec-
ord, reviews the submission, and, if the submission passes several procedural tests, asks
the Council for approval to compile a factual record. Id. arts. 14 and 15.
6. Cozumel raises issues which are important in and of themselves. In addition, as
the Commission's first major submission, the resolution of Cozumel should have impor.
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On January 18, 1996, three Mexican citizen groups
(Submitters) 7 presented the Commission with a submission
which alleged that the Mexican government issued permits for
construction and operation of a cruise ship dock on the Carib-
bean sea island of Cozumel without complying with Mexico's
Ecology Law. The Ecology Law requires the construction com-
pany file an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).8 The
Submitters were concerned that the construction could cause
damage to the Paradise Coral Reef, located off Cozumel Island.9
After requesting and receiving a response from the Mexican gov-
ernment, the Commission Secretariat decided to conduct an in-
vestigation and to prepare a factual record concerning the alle-
gations that Mexico failed to enforce its environmental laws. 10
Part I of this Comment describes the controversial history
surrounding the enactment of the Agreement and the establish-
ment of the Commission. Part II addresses the purpose and
structure of the Commission and the submission process provi-
sions. A summary of Mexican environmental laws with an em-
phasis on the principle law surrounding the dispute in Cozumel,
Mexico's Ecology Law is provided in Part III. An outline of
Mexico's environmental enforcement efforts appears in Part IV.
Part V discusses the importance and prevalence of the EIS. Part
VI reviews the procedural history of Cozumel to date, and Part
VII analyzes the issues raised in Cozumel. Finally, Part VIII
discusses the potential consequences of Cozumel impacting the
future of the Commission's effectiveness.
This Comment asserts that the fears of U.S. environmental-
ists that the Agreement's provisions will ultimately prove un-
workable have not been confirmed to date. Instead, the Agree-
ment appears to have created workable procedural mechanisms
for reviewing environmental citizen submissions. Further, while
tant precedential value and may set the tone for future submissions to the Commission.
7. The Mexican citizens groups which presented the submission are the Mexican
Center for Environmental Law (Centro Mexicano de Derecho Ambiental, A.C.), the Inter-
national Group of 100 (Grupo de los Cien Internacional, A. C.), and the Natural Resources
Protection Committee (Comiti para la Proteccidn de los Recursos Naturales, A.C.). Rec-
ommendation, supra note 1, at 1.
8. The Ecology Law requires that an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) be
filed with the Secretaria de Desarollo Social (Social Development Secretariat of Mexico or
SEDESL). For a more detailed discussion on the Ecology Law's EIS requirement, see in-
fra Part III.
9. Recommendation, supra note 1, at 3.
10. Id. at 4.
[Vol. 28:2
COZUMEL PIER SUBMISSION
all of those issues that concern U.S. environmentalists did not
arise in Cozumel,1 and although difficult legal issues remain for
the Commission to resolve, the Commission's disposition of the
submission thusfar provides a substantial basis for cautious op-
timism regarding the effectiveness of the Agreement's procedural
mechanisms and the Commission's willingness to compile factual
records for deserving submissions.
12
A. NAFTA's Historical Background
1. The Original NAFTA Proposal
NAFTA was first proposed by then-Vice President George
Bush in 1988 to strengthen the American economy and to solid-
ify North American trade relations in light of the rapid evolution
of the European Economic Community. Congress granted "fast
track" negotiation authority in May 1992, which enabled the
Bush administration to negotiate and sign NAFTA after a ninety
day period of consultation with Congress. 13
President Bush signed NAFTA on December 17, 1992.14
Congress' acceptance turned in large part on the drafting of the
11. In particular, Mexico did not argue that the decision not to require the filing of
an EIS was due to the reasonable allocation of its resources. See infra Part VII.F.
12. Victor Lichtinger, Executive Director, North American Commission for Envi-
ronmental Cooperation stated:
The Agreement and the Commission are looked to with a great sense of ex-
pectation by a wide range of communities of stakeholders within, and beyond,
North America. In practice, the extent to which these opportunities are real-
ized and the particular directions they take will ultimately be defined by the
specific elements of the legal agreement itself and the work of the Commis-
sion and their governments, in elaborating and implementing the mandate of
the agreement. This is particularly the case as many of the legal elements
embodied in the Agreement are novel and without precedent and will there-
fore be subject to ongoing interpretation in the context of evolving environ-
mental concerns of North Americans.
Victor Lichtinger, Executive Director, North American Commission for Environmental
Cooperation, Foreword to PIERRE MARC JOHNSON & ANDR]k BEAuLIEU, THE ENVI.
RONMENT AND NAFTA: UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING THE NEW CONTINENTAL
LAW, at xiii (1996).
13. Nicolas Kublicki, The Greening of Free Trade: NAFTA, Mexican Environmental
Law, and Debt Exchanges for Mexican Environmental Infrastructure Development, 19
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 59, 67 (1994).
14. Id. at 68.
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environmental and labor side agreements.' 5 In response to early
congressional concern about the level and thoroughness of Mexi-
can environmental regulation, the United States General Ac-
counting Office conducted a survey of Mexican environmental
law. The survey concluded that while Mexican environmental
regulations were equal to U.S. regulations in form, historically,
Mexico fell short in enforcement.' 6 NAFTA's inevitable unregu-
lated industrial growth in Mexico concerned U.S. environmental-
ists who feared that NAFTA's environmental provisions would
not fully address the challenges that the industrial growth would
present to Mexico's already inadequately enforced environmental
laws.17 The survey's findings focused the debate on issues of ef-
fective environmental law enforcement.18
2. "Pollution Havens" and "Downward Harmonization"
Primarily, U.S. environmentalists feared that NAFTA would
create incentives for corporations to move environmentally-
sensitive production to Mexican "pollution havens," which are
the least environmentally regulated areas available.' 9 By mov-
ing to the pollution havens, a company's production could con-
tinue unencumbered by U.S. environmental regulation, while
NAFTA's free trade provisions would allow the company untar-
iffed access to the U.S. market.
20
Environmental and congressional leaders were also con-
cerned that NAFTA would cause U.S. environmental standards
to decline. 21 Environmentalists' fear of "downward harmoniza-
tion" of U.S. laws and their concern about NAFTA's failure to
15. Sandra Le Priol-Vrejan, The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement and the
Power to Investigate Violations of Environmental Laws, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 483, 488
(1994).
16. Kal Raustiala, The Political Implications of the Enforcement Provisions of the
NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement: The CEC as a Model for Future Accords, 25
ENV'rL. L. 31, 35 (1995).
17. Kublicki, supra note 13, at 60-61. Whereas proponents of NAFTA perceived the
Agreement as a catalyst of economic growth and an indirect means to better environ.
mental protection, NAFTA's opponents saw it as insufficient to protect the environment
from the industrial growth which NAFTA was predicted to cause. Id.
18. Raustiala, supra note 16, at 35.
19. Id. at 34.
20. Id.
21. Linda DuPuis, The Environmental Side Agreement Between Mexico and the
United States-An Effective Compromise?, 8 FLA. J. INT'L L. 471, 479 (1993).
442 [Vol. 28:2
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regulate industry were the primary threats to ratification of
NAFTA by the United States. "Downward harmonization" gen-
erally describes a theory of NAFTA's possible effect on environ-
mental regulations in the United States. The theory is that
NAFTA's free market forces will cause the United States and
Canada's environmental laws to become weaker as a conse-
quence of Mexico's sporadic enforcement of its environmental
laws.
2 2
The environmentalists pointed to the maquiladoras to but-
tress their claims that NAFTA would lead to rapid environ-
mental degradation in Mexico. 23 A maquiladora, also known as
22. Kevin W. Patton, Dispute Resolution Under the North American Commission on
Environmental Cooperation, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 87, 92 (1994), citing Stewart
Baker, After the NAFTA, 27 INT'L LAw. 765, 769 (1993). The opposition to NAFTA within
the U.S. environmental community was so strong that several nonprofit environmental
groups brought suit against the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (OTR) alleging
that the OTR violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) procedural re-
quirements by failing to provide an EIS in connection with the ongoing NAFTA negotia-
tions. Public Citizen v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 970 F.2d 916, 917 (D.C.
Cir. 1992). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the case. Id. at 923. The Court of Appeals held that the OTR's fail-
ure to prepare an EIS for NAFTA was not judicially reviewable because OTRs prepara-
tion and submission of NAFTA to the President was not a "final agency action" subject to
NEPA's EIS requirement. Id.
Similarly, the National Association of Ecological Organizations in Mexico City
filed a complaint with the Mexican federal attorney general for the environment, de-
manding that Mexico be required to prepare an EIS before it ratified NAFTA. Mexican
Ecology Groups File Complaint to Force Impact Statement on NAFTA Accord, 16 Int'l
Env't Rep. (BNA) 646 (1993). The complaint alleged that NAFTA will lead to industrial
growth which could damage Mexico's environment. Id. The attorney general, however,
rejected the complaint, stating that while the Ecology Law requires EISs for specific
projects or activities, it does not apply to trade agreements. Mexican Official Rejects
Complaint Calling for Environmental Impact Statement, 16 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 671
(1993). The organization had the right to appeal the attorney general's decision, but ap-
parently the organization has not successfully appealed an environmental complaint in
the past and did not choose to do so. Id.
Two Agreement provisions which ensure each country's national sovereignty
support the environmentalists' fears. The Agreement affirms the "right of each [country]
to establish its own levels of domestic environmental protection" and the right of each
country to "exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and devel-
opment policies." Agreement, supra note 3, art. 3. Other factors, however, may prevent
this fear from becoming a reality. In particular, many members of the American public,
whether impassioned "environmentalists" or not, would refuse to allow U.S. laws to sink
to the level of current Mexican law enforcement. In addition, there are already economic
incentives for the United States to relax its environmental (and labor) standards in order
to more effectively compete in the world market, but the United States has not chosen to
do so.
23. The environmental problems included "fresh water supply, industrial and mu-
nicipal wastewater, air pollution, municipal solid waste, and industrial hazardous and
444 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:2
an in-bond export facility, is a foreign-owned manufacturing
plant located somewhere along Mexico's 2000 mile border with
the United States. 24 Maquiladoras were established in 1965 to
promote growth in manufacturing 2 by taking advantage of
Mexico's inexpensive labor and minimal environmental regula-
tions.26 In 1983, the United States and Mexico signed the
Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement
in the Border Area (La Paz Agreement) which addressed the en-
vironmental problems caused by rapid industrialization and
population growth around the maquiladoras.7 The tentative
appraisal of the La Paz Agreement is that environmental en-
forcement in the maquiladoras has improved in recent years.
28
3. The Response to Environmentalists' Concerns
Responding to these concerns over the environment, then-
Governor Bill Clinton promised in a 1992 Presidential campaign
speech to pursue a supplemental agreement to NAFTA, which
would require each country to be responsible for its own envi-
ronmental laws and regulations.29 President Clinton took office
nonhazardous waste." Alberto A. Bustani & Patrick W. Mackay, NAFTA. Reflections on
Environmental Issues During the First Year, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 543, 545 (1995).
24. For a general discussion of the maquiladoras, see L. Gray Sanders, Maquilado-
ras and the Yucatan, 5 FLA. INVL L.J. 525 (1990); Elizabeth C. Rose, Transboundary
Harm: Hazardous Waste Management Problems and Mexico's Maquiladoras, 23 INT'L
LAW. 223 (1989); see also Michael D. Madnick, NAFTA' A Catalyst for Environmental
Change in Mexico, 11 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 373 (1993). The experience of the rapid
growth of the maquiladoras and the concomitant rapid decline in environmental stan-
dards in their surroundings may be the best argument of those who fear that American
jobs are being lost as a result ofNAFTA. Id. at 374.
25. Bustani & Mackay, supra note 23, at 545.
26. Kublicki, supra note 13, at 92.
27. The Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement in the Bor-
der Area, Aug. 14, 1983, Mex.-U.S., T.I.A.S. No. 10,827. Annexes to the Agreement on
Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement in the Border Area, July 18, 1985-Oct.
3, 1989, Mex.-U.S., T.I.A.S. No. 11269.
28. In 1989, only six percent of maquiladoras adhere to the government license re-
quirements. At the time, SEDUE, now replaced by the Social Development Secretariat of
Mexico (SEDESOL), did not maintain a list of maquiladoras that produced toxic wastes,
effluents, or air pollutants. By 1992, however, over sixty-seven percent of the maquila-
doras had been inspected and over fifty-four percent of maquiladoras had begun to com-
ply. In addition, twenty-two maquiladoras were closed permanently in 1992. Kublicki,
supra note 13, at 91-92.
29. Remarks by Governor Bill Clinton at the Student Center at North Carolina
State University (Oct. 4, 1992), in NAFTA & THE ENVIRONMENT 263 (Daniel Magraw ed.,
1995). Clinton stated that he would establish an environmental commission to encour-
age the enforcement of each country's own environmental laws. Clinton also stated that
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after the signing of NAFTA, but before the U.S. Congress had
ratified it.80 Negotiations between the United States and Mexico
for the creation of the environmental side agreement began on
March 17, 1993, and President Clinton signed the Agreement on
September 14, 1993.31 The Agreement and the Commission were
thus created largely in response to concerns over the perceived
limitations of the NAFTA dispute resolution process in dealing
with environmental matters.
32
B. NAFTA's Environmental Provisions
Both NAFTA and the Agreement contain provisions which
protect each country's sovereignty. Like the Agreement, NAFTA
allows each country to maintain its own level of environmental
protection, including the continued application of EIS require-
ment.3 3 More significantly, NAFTA permits each country to es-
tablish its own levels of environmental protection.
34
The Agreement complements several of NAFTA's provisions
concerning sovereignty. For example, Agreement Article 3 and
NAFTA Article 904(2) both recognize the right of each nation to
establish its own levels of environmental protection. Agreement
Article 40 and NAFTA Article 104 maintain that nothing in ei-
ther document will affect the nations' existing rights under cur-
rent international environmental agreements.
8 5
NAFTA Article 1114 recognizes that "it is inappropriate to
encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or en-
the environmental commission should have the power to provide remedies, including the
power to assess money damages. Id. at 265-66.
30. Le Priol-Vrejan, supra note 15, at 488.
31. Id.
32. It is clear from Clinton's statements that such supplemental environmental
agreements were prerequisites to his approval of NAFTA_ Remarks by Governor Bill
Clinton, supra note 29, at 263.
Under the environmental and labor side agreements, each country remains free
to set its own labor and environmental standards at whatever level of protection it deems
necessary. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 3. North American Agreement on Labor Coop-
eration, opened for signature Sept. 9, 1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 2, 32 I.L.M. 1499, 1503
(1993) [hereinafter Labor Agreement]. Both supplemental agreements establish citizen
submission processes. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 14. See also Labor Agreement, su-
pra, art. 16(3). See infra Part I.D, II.C.
33. Kublicki, supra note 13, at 71.
34. NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 901.
35. Id. art. 104.
1996-971
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vironmental measures."36 An agreement that merely recognizes
the inappropriateness of a particular act does not, of course,
make a violation of that act an enforceable offense. Thus, Article
1114 creates no substantive environmental obligations for
NAFTA members.
37
The Agreement's Preamble establishes environmental pro-
tection is its primary goal. Like NAFTA Article 1114, the
Agreement's Preamble does not bind any of the countries to any
particular standard of protection.3 8 The Preamble and Article 1
establish some of the provisions that enable the Agreement to
protect the environment more effectively than other interna-
tional trade agreements. These sections delineate the broad
general principles upon which the Agreement is founded and
link the Agreement to NAFTA's goals of providing enhanced
levels of environmental protection. The countries also re-affirm,
in deference to state sovereignty, the right of each nation to ex-
ploit its own natural resources pursuant to its independent na-
tional environmental policy.39 At the same time, NAFTA mem-
bers acknowledge the need to maintain environmental laws and
regulatory procedures without creating additional trade barri-
ers.40
C. Upward Harmonization
Mexico has already enacted environmental legislation con-
taining standards which are similar to those of the United
States. The differences in the countries' domestic environmental
laws, however, may present major barriers to upward harmoni-
zation of Mexico's regulation and enforcement of those environ-
mental standards. The access to environmental information, the
feasibility of bringing citizen enforcement suits, administrative
36. Id. art. 1114(2). NAFTA's drafters specifically included this provision to dis-
courage the creation of"pollution havens." DuPuis, supra note 21, at 486.
37. DuPuis, supra note 21, at 486. Both environmental and congressional leaders
criticized NAFTA's lack of any enforcement power. Id. In response to this criticism,
President Clinton reiterated his commitment to the principle that the Agreement would
guarantee that each country enforce its own environmental laws. Id.
38. Reid A. Middleton, NAFTA & The Environmental Side Agreement: Fusing Eco-
nomic Development with Ecological Responsibility, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1025, 1043
(1994).
39. Agreement, supra note 3, art. l(a), (d).
40. Id. art. 1(e), (f).
[Vol. 28:2
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review, and due process procedures differ greatly among the
NAFTA countries, as do the structure and terms of their laws
and the roles of federal, state, and local authorities. 4' The
Agreement's primary objective is "enhanced compliance with,
and enforcement of, environmental laws and regulations."
42
While the Agreement allows each NAFTA country the right to
set its own levels of domestic environmental protection,
43 it
nonetheless urges each country to ensure that its laws provide
for "high levels of environmental protection.""
To attain this goal of "high levels of environmental protec-
tion," the Commission can investigate complaints of a country's
failure to enforce environmental laws. 45  Additionally, the
Agreement enables citizens, NGOs, businesses, and government
entities to request Commission investigations.4 The Commis-
sion's Secretariat, which provides support to the Commission's
Council, has the power to review a submission from any private
group or person which asserts that a country "is failing to effec-
tively enforce its environmental law."47 The Agreement's dispute
resolution process addresses circumstances in which the submit-
ter demonstrates a "persistent pattern of failure by a country to
effectively enforce its environmental law." If the submission
meets certain procedural and substantive criteria, the Secretar-
iat may, subject to Council approval, propose the development of
a factual record.49
Several other provisions of the Agreement serve to limit its
application and potential impact. Perhaps most significant is
Article 45, "Definitions" which creates an exception to enforce-
ment-namely, that a party will not be deemed to have failed to
"enforce its environmental laws [if] the action or inaction in
question by agencies or officials" of that country "reflects a rea-
41. C. Foster Knight, Voluntary Environmental Standards vs. Mandatory Environ-
mental Regulations and Enforcement in the NAFTA Market, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
619, 634 (1995).
42. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 1(g).
43. Id. art. 3.
44. Id.
45. Id. arts. 15 and 21.
46. Id. art. 14(1).
47. Id.
48. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 22(1). The Agreement defines a "persistent pat-
tern" as a "sustained or recurring course of action or inaction beginning after the date of
entry into force of this Agreement." Id. art. 45(1)(b).
49. Id. art. 15.
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sonable exercise of discretion," 50 or "results from bona fide deci-
sions to allocate resources to enforcement" in respect of higher
environmental priorities.5' A "reasonable exercise of discretion"
does not appear to be a difficult standard to meet. Also, due to
Mexico's modest resources and underdeveloped infrastructure, it
may often have to make "bona fide decisions to allocate re-
sources" that would result in lax enforcement of some environ-
mental laws. Thus, both of these exceptions could potentially
eviscerate the goal of the Agreement requiring "high levels of
environmental protection."
D. Citizen Access
Citizen access to the respective court systems of each
NAFTA country varies greatly. While U.S. citizens have broad
access to the courts to address environmental issues, Mexican
and Canadian citizens do not enjoy comparable access.5 2 Citizen
suits are essentially nonexistent internationally.5 3 "Citizen at-
torney general actions" against the government for nonenforce-
ment or lax enforcement are a common occurrence in the United
States.5 4 U.S. laws also permit citizen suits against private par-
ties alleged to have violated the environmental laws in circum-
stances where the government lacks the will or ability to provide
enforcement.5 5 Despite the enactment of the Ecology Law,
56
50. Id. art. 45(1)(a).
51. Id. art. 45(1)(b) (emphasis in original). A two-thirds vote is required for the
Council to make the factual record public. Id. art. 15(2). "The preparation of a factual
record by the Secretariat ... shall be without prejudice to any further steps that may be
taken with respect to any submission." Id. art. 15(3).
52. Mark J. Spaulding, Transparency of Environmental Regulations and Public
Participation in the Resolution of International Environmental Disputes, 35 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 1127, 1135 (1995).
53. Id.
54. Philip C. Jessup, former Judge of the International Court of Justice, noted the
importance of public involvement, notification, and participation in dispute resolution.
He stated that "it would be folly to provide for the settlement of disputes" in the interna-
tional arena without allowing for the participation of "those entitled which will be as
much concerned with enforcement of the new standards as will governments of states."
Patton, supra note 22, at 94, citing Philip C. Jessup, Do New Problems Need New
Courts?, 65 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 261, 265 (1971). But see Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1976) (rejecting citizen suit against the United States on the
ground that plaintiffs lacked standing because they could not show imminent injury).
55. Patton, supra note 22, at 94. The United States created the citizen suit in the
Clean Air Act, Section 304, as amended in 1970. JEFFREY G. MILLER, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW INSTITUTE, CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL
[Vol. 28:2
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which comprehensively covers environmental issues, Mexico has
yet to developed the enforcement structure to effectively imple-
ment that law. 57 The Agreement, however, makes some provi-
sions for public participation and public information.58 The
Agreement gives interested persons the right to request an in-
vestigation of environmental violations and provides
"appropriate" access to judicial or administrative procedures.5 9
II. THE AGREEMENT AND THE COMMISSION
A. Summary of the Agreement
The Agreement consists of seven parts.60 Most significant to
the analysis and resolution of the issues raised in Cozumel is
Part Two which includes "Obligations," among which the most
important requirement is to assess environmental impact.
6 1
The Agreement requires that each country "shall ensure
that its laws and regulations provide for high levels of environ-
mental protection and shall strive to continue to improve those
laws and regulations." 62  The Agreement further provides that
the Secretariat, in considering a submission, shall be guided by
whether the submitter has pursued "private remedies available
under the [country's] laws."
6 3
LAWS 4 (1987). The citizen suit provisions which are contained in other U.S. environ-
mental statutes closely follow the language of the Clean Air Act, Section 304. Id. at 7.
These sections authorize "any person" to commence suit to enforce compliance with the
acts against "any person" alleged to breach them or to require the government to execute
a compulsory duty under the acts. Id.
56. See infra note 99.
57. Spaulding, supra note 52, at 1135.
58. Agreement, supra note 3, arts. 10, 21, and 39.
59. Id. art. 6.
60. The seven parts of the Agreement include the following: 1) Objectives, article 1;
2) Obligations, Articles. 2-7; 3) Commission, Articles 8-19; 4) Cooperation and Provision
of Information, Articles 20-21; 5) Consultation and Resolution of Disputes, Articles 22-36;
6) General Provisions, Articles 37-45; 7) Final Provisions, Articles 46-51. Agreement,
supra note 3.
61. Id. art. 2(1)(e).
62. Id. art. 3. Unfortunately, the Agreement does not define "high levels" and there
is no guarantee that any of the NAFTA countries would not lower their standards. Steve
Charnovitz, The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement: Implications for Environ-
mental Cooperation, Trade Policy, and American Treatymaking, 8 TEMP. INIVL & COMP.
L.J. 257, 261 (1994).
63. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 14(2)(c).
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B. Structure of the Commission
Part Three of the Agreement establishes the Commission,
64
which comprises of a Council, a Secretariat, and a Joint Advisory
Committee. The Council consists of cabinet-level ministers from
each country,65 which chooses an Executive Director to head the
Council for a three-year term.66 The Council is the Commission's
governing body67 and may develop recommendations regarding
strategies for environmental improvements. 68 The Secretariat is
responsible for "provid[ing] technical, administrative, and op-
erational support to the Council and groups established by the
Council. 69 The Secretariat may consider citizens submissions
70
and, in compelling circumstances, compile a factual record.
71
The Joint Public Advisory Committee consists of five individuals
from the member countries. 72 One function of this Committee is
to advise the Council on any matter within the scope of the
Agreement. 73 In addition, the Joint Public Advisory Committee
"may provide relevant technical, scientific or other information
to the Secretariat, including [information needed] for [the] pur-
poses of developing a factual record."
74
C. The Commission Citizen Submission Process
The citizen submission process begins when a citizen sub-
mits for the Secretariat's review a written request asserting that
a country is "failing to effectively enforce its environmental
laws."75 The Secretariat determines whether the written request
contains sufficient evidence, 76 promotes enforcement rather than
harassing industry,77 indicates that the matter was communi-
64. Id. art. 8(1).
65. Id. art. 9(1).
66. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 11(1).
67. Id. art. 10(1).
68. Id. art. 10(2).
69. Id. art. 11(5).
70. Id. art. 14.
71. Id. art. 15.
72. Id. art. 16(1).
73. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 16(4).
74. Id. art. 16(5).
75. Id. art. 14.
76. Id. art. 14(1)(c).
77. Id. art. 14(1)(d).
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cated to the offending party,78 and that the country being com-
plained about has been informed and has responded.79 If the
submission passes these requirements, the Secretariat then de-
cides whether to request a response from the country complained
of by the submitters. In doing so, the Secretariat considers
whether "the submission alleges harm to the person or organi-
zation making the submission,"80 whether the submission raises
issues which could advance the goals of the Agreement,81
whether the submitters have pursued any available private
remedies, 82 and whether the submission is drawn exclusively
from mass media reports.83 The Secretariat may then request
the country to prepare a response within thirty days.84
If the submission meets all the criteria, the Secretariat then
prepares a factual record and submits it to the Council, which
may publish it after a two-thirds vote. 85 The Secretariat will not
prepare a factual record, however, if the matter "is the subject of
a pending judicial or administrative proceeding."86 Finally, "the
Council may, by a two-thirds vote, make the final factual record
publicly available."8' 7
The factual record itself does not, standing alone, trigger any
legal consequences, but it could lead to formal consultation pro-
ceedings that, in turn, could ultimately lead to sanctions against
the offending country.88 The publication of a factual record that
criticizes a country's enforcement may also cause the country,
out of concern over consequent political fallout, to improve its en-
forcement.8 9
The Council appoints a panel that considers several factors
in setting the amount of the fine. The fine assessed may not ex-
78. Id. art. 14(2)(e).
79. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 14(1)(d).
80. Id. art. 14(2)(a).
81. Id. art. 14(2)(b).
82. Id. art. 14(2)(c).
83. Id. art. 14(2)(d).
84. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 14(3). However, in exceptional circumstances,
and on notification of the Secretariat, the country may advise the Secretariat within
sixty days of the delivery of the request. Id.
85. Id. art. 15(1).
86. Id. arts. 14(3)(a) and 45(3)(a).
87. Id. art. 15(7).
88. David S. Baron, NAFTA and the Environment-Making the Side Agreement




ceed twenty million dollars for claims arising in 1994; after 1994,
the fine may not exceed .007% of the total trade between the
countries during the most recent year.90
D. Interpretation of 'Failure To Enforce"
The Agreement requires each country to "effectively enforce
its environmental laws and regulations through appropriate gov-
ernment action."91 A complaint that a country "is failing to ef-
fectively enforce its environmental law" triggers the factual rec-
ord procedure. The Secretariat then determines whether there
has been "a persistent pattern of failure" by a country "to effec-
tively enforce its environmental law." 92 Thus, it is essential to
determine what "failure to effectively enforce" means.
The Agreement affords each country the discretion to prose-
cute its environmental laws to a "reasonable" degree. 93 To ad-
vance the Agreement's purpose of promoting high levels of envi-
ronmental compliance, the Commission must be particularly
judicious in evaluating the term "reasonable." If the Agreement
is to be enforceable, the Commission cannot interpret
"reasonable" so as to permit the country to arbitrarily and com-
pletely fail to enforce its environmental laws.
The events surrounding the enactment of the Agreement al-
low for two plausible but mutually-exclusive determinations of
whether a particular act or omission constitutes a "failure to ef-
fectively enforce." On the one hand, presumably, Mexico would
not sign an agreement which it was currently violating. If this
presumption is correct, then the other NAFTA countries must
not have viewed Mexico's environmental enforcement levels at
the time of enactment as unjustifiable. 94 If so, in order to comply
90. Agreement, supra note 3, Annex 34(1). First, the panel will consider the dura-
tion and the pervasiveness of the country's pattern of nonenforcement. Second, the panel
will consider whether the level of enforcement required by the environmental law could
be reasonably expected given the country's resources. Third, the panel will consider the
reasons that the country proffers for its failure to enforcement. Fourth, the panel will
acknowledge the efforts made by the country to remedy its pattern of nonenforcement
since the time when the final report was written. Finally, the panel will consider any
other relevant factors. Id. at Annex 34(2)(a)-(e).
91. Id. art. 5.
92. Id. arts. 14(1), 22(1), and 28(3).
93. Id. art. 45.
94. Kubhcki, supra note 13, at 112.
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with the Agreement, Mexico need not improve its environmental
enforcement, but rather merely needs to maintain its enforce-
ment policies at the same level as they existed at the time it
signed the Agreement. On the other hand, the sole reason that
the United States wanted to secure Mexico's approval of the
Agreement was because it believed that Mexico's levels of envi-
ronmental enforcement were unacceptable. 95 Thus, a clarifica-
tion of acceptable levels of enforcement is not at once discernible
on the basis of the countries' expectations at the time they
signed the Agreement.
Alternatively, the Commission could interpret "failure to ef-
fectively enforce" to mean that a violating country failed to meet
the highest standard set by the NAFTA countries. In such a
case, only a level of enforcement equivalent to that of the United
States or Canada would be justified. This would require further
interpretation because Canada may be more strict in some areas,
while the United States may be more strict in others. Setting
such a high level of environmental enforcement would also create
a nearly impossible task for Mexico to achieve.
96
In interpreting the "failure to effectively enforce" provision,
it is also significant to note that the United States does not al-
ways effectively enforce its own environmental laws. For in-
stance, both the Bush and the Clinton Administrations have
failed to comply with a statutory requirement to submit a report
comparing air quality standards among major U.S. trading part-
ners.97 Thus, it appears that the United States itself might be
unable to withstand a very strict application of the "failure to ef-
fectively enforce" standard to its environmental enforcement rec-
ord.
A more skeptical view of the Agreement is that the United
States had no intention of procuring improvements in Mexico's
environmental enforcement efforts at the time the Agreement
was conceived. Under this view, the Agreement was merely a
ruse to obtain Congressional approval for NAFTA. In carrying
out the ruse, the NAFTA countries entered into an international
agreement that was intentionally unenforceable because of its
95. Id. at 60-61. See discussion supra Part I.A.1. In particular, see the finding of
the U.S. Accounting Office survey.
96. Kublicki, supra note 13, at 60-61.




This author contends that while a plain reading of the
Agreement precludes an objective determination of the meaning
of "failure to effectively enforce," the Agreement remains feasible
and meaningful. This view presupposes that neither Mexico nor
the United States believed that Mexico was in compliance with
the Agreement at the time that the parties enacted it, but that
the NAFTA countries thereby tacitly agreed that Mexico would
improve the enforcement of its environmental laws. It has been
suggested that such a "just do your best" standard contradicts
both the principle that the countries owe under the Agreement
and the environmentally sound competitiveness underlying the
dispute settlement process.98
However, the countries did not agree to a "just do your best"
standard-such a malleable standard would preclude the estab-
lishment of any baseline of acceptable enforcement. Rather, I
contend that the United States planned to use the Agreement
and the Commission as tools to encourage Mexico to improve its
environmental enforcement efforts. The United States planned
to bring pressing issues to the attention of the Commission. The
United States expected that Mexican citizens, like U.S. citizens,
would also highlight other instances of their own government's
failure to enforce its environmental laws. The "failure to en-
force" provision, under this view, is intentionally broad. Thus,
the Commission has a great deal of discretion in determining
whether there has been a failure to enforce, and should consider
the realities of Mexico's economic state in order to apply the
standard pragmatically.
III. MEXICO'S ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
The centerpiece of Mexico's environmental policies is embod-
ied in the Ecology Law which took effect on March 1, 1988.
99 The
98. PIERRE MARC JOHNSON & ANDR2 BEAULIEU, THE ENVIRONMENT AND NAFTA:
UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING THE NEW CONTINENTAL LAW 207 (1996).
99. Ley General del Equilibrio Ecol6gico y la Protecci6n al Ambiente [General Law
on Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection], D.O., 28 de enero de 1988
(Mex.), translated in Doing Business in Mexico, pt. XI, app. 2 (1996) [hereinafter Ecology
Law].
Mexico enacted the Ecology Law in 1988, apparently in part to prevent further
environmental degradation and in part to facilitate acceptance into NAFTA. The other
main sources of Mexican environmental laws are its Constitution, the Environmental
[Vol. 28:2454
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purpose of the Ecology Law is to preserve and restore the eco-
logical balance and to provide for environmental protection. 0 0
The Ecology Law is supplemented by seven federal regula-
tions.10 1 The Law and its regulations require the submission of
an EIS before any potential contaminating public or private proj-
ect may be authorized.
0 2
The Ecology Law establishes the federal government's
authority to set environmental standards'0 3 and has delegated to
the Secretariat for Urban and Ecological Development
(SEDUE) 0 4 the authority to develop environmental policy,
promulgate environmental regulations, review EISs and envi-
ronmental license applications, enforce environmental regula-
tions, and coordinate environmental protection efforts among
federal, state, and local government agencies. 105 The Ecology
Law requires an EIS application from anyone who wants to con-
duct activities within Mexican territory which may cause an en-
vironmental imbalance or may exceed the established limits or
conditions. 10 6 EIS applications must be filed with the replace-
ment for the SEDUE, the Social Development Secretariat of
Mexico, which determines both the potential environmental im-
pact and adequacy of the protection proposal. 10 7 An EIS must be
Laws and Regulations, the Ecological Technical Norms, and the International Treaties.
Hector Herrera, Mexican Environmental Legal Framework, 2 SAN DIEGO JUSTICE J. 31
(1994). Since 1938, Mexico has signed almost all international environmental treaties
and agreements. Id. at 33.
100. Herrera, supra note 99, at 31-32. The Ecology Law contains provisions on the
following matters: "protected natural areas, national exploitation of natural elements,
environmental protection, community participation, and control and safety measures and
penalties." Id. at 32.
101. Id. at 33.
102. Kublicki, supra note 13, at 85. An EIS must: describe both the proposed project
and its potential environmental impact; name the drafters of the documents; list the sub-
stances used in the projects; state the emissions or effluent that the project will produce;
provide corporate information; describe the natural, social, and economic environment of
the area; and list any applicable local land use regulations. The SEDESOL imposes spe-
cial scrutiny on several kinds of projects including: construction, water projects, bridges,
federal tourism developments, and projects which impact either two or more Mexican
states or Mexico and a neighboring country. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 85.
105. Id. at 83-84.
106. Herrera, supra note 99, at 33.
107. The Mexican EIS requirement is in some respects more severe than the NEPA's
EIS requirement. First, both public and private works must meet the Ecology Law's EIS
requirement. The NEPA, on the other hand, requires an EIS only for federal projects.
The EIS in Mexico provides the sole basis for approving or rejecting a project, whereas an
American EIS is purely procedural under the NEPA-at least as interpreted by the Su-
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supported by an Environmental Impact Study, which only per-
sons or firms duly authorized by the National Institute of Ecol-
ogy can perform. 0 8 The Ecology Law also provides for severe
sanctions against environmental violators, s09 and for criminal
penalties for severe environmental violations. 110
IV. MEXICO'S ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT HISTORY
A. The Discrepancy Between Mexico's
Environmental Laws And Enforcement
Although some Mexican environmental legislation resembles
U.S. laws, the Mexican government has historically failed to ef-
fectively enforce its environmental laws."' Recently, Mexico has
exhibited a commitment to higher environmental standards and
a willingness to correct pollution problems, particularly along
the Texas-Mexico border. 112 In 1992, Mexico began serious ef-
forts to enforce its environmental laws with the establishment of
the federal office of the Environmental Attorney General." 3
preme Court. Kleppe et al v. Sierra Club et al, 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
108. Herrera, supra note 99, at 33-34. If the project is considered high risk, a Risk
Study must be filed with the EIS. The Risk Study must state the risks that the project
poses to the environment, as well as the technical security measures required to prevent,
diminish, or control adverse effects on the environment. Id.
109. A company which violates the Ecology Law may be subject to fines of twenty to
twenty thousand times the minimum daily wage and the operations may be either sus-
pended or terminated. Once these initial sanctions have been imposed, the violator must
comply within thirty days or potentially face additional sanctions up to twenty thousand
times the minimum wage. Further, fines for persistent violations may reach forty thou-
sand times the minimum wage. Kublicki, supra note 13, at 88-89.
110. Id. at 89. Criminal penalties can be imposed for crimes that endanger human
health, endanger areas with dense populations, or severely damage ecosystems. Jail
terms of three months to six years are available for crimes that endanger human health
or severely damage ecosystems. Id.
111. Kublicki, supra note 13, at 60-61.
112. However, Mexico's primary motivation in passing environmental laws may have
been for the United States to approve NAFTA. DuPuis, supra note 21, at 476.
113. Knight, supra note 41, at 629. From June 1992 through April 1995, the Envi-
ronmental Attorney General inspected 35,831 plants, ordered the closure of 348 plants,
1758 partial closures, and either fined or ordered remedial action at 25,570 facilities for
minor infractions. Id. In addition, in 1992, SEDESOL conducted seventy-two environ-
mental audits and reviewed thousands of citizen environmental complaints. Between
July and December of 1992 alone, SEDESOL examined 795 citizen complaints, nearly
half (forty-eight percent) of which originated in Mexico City. Id. at 92-93, citing Office of
Representation, SEDESOL, Mexican Embassy, Activities of the Office of the Attorney
General for the Protection of the Environment During 1992 (1)(1993) (unpaginated
photo-duplicated memorandum available from Embassy of Mexico, Wash., D.C.).
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Notwithstanding the improving Mexican enforcement record and
the new Secretariat of the Environment's continuing commit-
ment to enforcement, the effectiveness and quality of Mexican
enforcement effort significantly lags behind that of Canada and
the United States.
114
Mexico's lack of financial resources significantly inhibits en-
forcement of its environmental laws." 5 Government inspectors
are few, and their salaries and morale are low. However, recent
plant closings, the hiring of additional inspectors, and joint
Mexican-U.S. enforcement efforts demonstrate Mexico's recent
resolve to enforce its environmental law."
16
Although the Mexican government has established over 5000
health, safety, and environmental standards pursuant to the
Ecology Law, limited public notification and lack of procedure to
ensure private sector participation have resulted in a vague sys-
tem of establishing standards and technical regulations." 7 Un-
fortunately, the Ecology Law appears to have done little to im-
prove Mexico's environmental law enforcement or to protect the
environment.
Thus, if the Commission proves to be accessible to private
groups and effectively processes citizen submissions and enforces
its determinations, the Commission may be the institutional
force which ensures that Mexico improves its environmental law
enforcement and minimizes the detrimental impact on North
America's environment by NAFTA-induced economic growth.
B. Federalism's Effect on Environmental
Enforcement
The Ecology Law is the catalyst for the current trend to-
wards the decentralization of environmental authority from the
Mexican federal government to state and local governments." 8
114. Kublicki, supra note 13, at 90.
115. Lawrence J. Rowe, NAFTA, The Border Area Environmental Program, and Mex-
ico's Border Area. Prescription for Sustainable Development? 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNATiL L.
REV. 197, 220-21 (1995).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Bustani & Mackay, supra note 23, at 546. For instance, environmental areas
such as risk assessments, environmental emergencies, and hazardous materials and
wastes generally fall under federal responsibility. The states, on the other hand, gen-
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In particular, state and local governments are gaining greater
responsibility concerning environmental policymaking and en-
forcement. The Ecology Law covers matters of national but not
strictly federal nature, so they are subject to state and local gov-
ernments' jurisdiction."1 The Mexican Congress has provided
that the rules governing enforcement mechanisms are to be uni-
form among the states.1
20
This dissipation of the power to enforce the environmental
laws may make it more difficult for the Commission to determine
an objective standard for "failure to effectively enforce."
Whether the laws are being "effectively enforced" may turn on
whether the Commission examines the enforcement policy as a
whole or the enforcement policy in a particular region.
V. THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
The EIS supporters claim the EIS is a proven technique
which provides a process for institutionalizing foresight that
avoids or, at least, minimizes the unanticipated adverse effects
of industrial growth. 1 1 In any event, the EIS is a common ap-
proach both in the United States and internationally. 122 While
its essential structure is substantially the same throughout the
world, the EIS is flexible and has been adopted successfully to
operate within many different cultural, political, and socio-
economic arenas. 123 The EIS is increasingly gaining acceptance
as a decisionmaking technique.
124
The EIS provides citizens with an opportunity to be heard
and to participate in decisionmaking that affects their environ-
ment.125 Supporters of the EIS process claim it is demonstrably
effective in compiling environmental data for decisionmakers. 126
erally regulate water pollution and vehicle emissions, monitor air emissions, oversee the
compliance with water pollution regulations, municipal sewage systems, solid waste dis-
posal and state wildlife reserves.
119. Ecology Law, supra note 99, art. 4.
120. Id. art. 160.
121. For an extensive analysis on the EIS in the international context, see Nicholas
A. Robinson, The 1991 Bellagio Conference on U.S.-U.S.S.R. Environmental Protection
Institution: International Trends in Environmental Impacts Assessment, 19 B.C. ENVTL.








The EIS works best when an independent authority is available
to oversee the process. 127 Under the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA), for example, the U.S. courts provide this
oversight through judicial review. 28 Environmental issues that
were unanticipated in the process of project preparation are of-
ten identified during the preparation of an EIS before unin-
tended damage occurs.129 In sum, the EIS is a potentially useful
mechanism for preventing industrial environmental damage
which both the Agreement and the Ecology Law respect. 130
VI. THE COZUMEL PIER SUBMISSION
A. Procedural History
On January 18, 1996, three Mexican NGOs presented the
Secretariat with a submission under Article 14 of the Agree-
ment. 1 1 On February 8, 1996, the Secretariat requested a re-
sponse from Mexico, 32 and the Mexican government responded
to the submission on March 27, 1996.13
B. The Submission
The Submitters allege that Mexican environmental authori-
ties are failing to effectively enforce environmental law by ignor-
ing the EIS requirement in connection with the construction and
operation of a port terminal and related works located in
Cozumel, Quintana Roo.134 The Submitters contend that the
project contravenes the language and intent of the 1988 Ecology
Law. 185 They further assert that the concessionaire failed to
127. Robinson, supra note 121, at 594.
128. Id.
129. Id. As stated above at note 22, the response of the U.S. environmental com-
munity, fearing that Mexico would continue to be a "pollution haven" because of NAFTA,
was to sue on the basis that the U.S. failed to file an EIS concerning NAFTA. It is thus
ironic that the first case to reach the stage in which the Commission will compile a fac-
tual record concerns Mexico's failure to require the filing of an EIS.
130. See Kublicki, supra note 13, at 71.




135. The Ecology Law provides that "performance of public or private works or ac-
tivities which may cause ecological imbalance or exceed the limits and conditions pro-
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comply with Subpart (e) of Condition Five contained in the Port
Terminal Concession issued by the Secretary of Communication
and Transportation on July 22, 1993. Condition Five provides
that the concessionaire "must present to the Secretary the Ex-
ecutive Project for undertaking the works, containing the follow-
ing information: (e) the departmentally-reviewed [EIS] respect-
ing the construction and operation of the terminal."13 6  The
Submitters note that Article 2, Part IV of the Ley de Puertos
(Law of Ports) governing the concession defines the terminal as:
"the facilities established in or outside of a port, consisting of
works, installations and surfaces, including off-shore, which al-
low for the integral operation of the port in accordance with its
intended uses." 13 7 The Submitters conclude that Mexican envi-
ronmental authorities have required the concessionaire only to
submit an EIS for the construction of the pier at Cozumel rather
than requiring for the totality of related on-shore port terminal
facilities, including a passenger building, access road, and park-
ing lot. 1
38
C. Summary of Mexico's Response
Mexico responded by raising procedural issues concerning
the Secretariat's decision both to accept the submission and to
request a response from Mexico. In addition, it also disputes the
Submitters' other legal contentions. 139 Mexico began by assert-
ing that the matters raised in the submission are based on acts
which took place prior to the enactment of the Agreement.140
Mexico then contended that Article 14(1) limits the scope of in-
quiry to allegations that a Party "is failing" to effectively enforce
its environmental law.14' Because the statutory language is
phrased in present tense, Mexico asserts that the Agreement
does not apply to any instances of failure to enforce environ-
mental laws that occurred in the past. In sum, Mexico considers
the matters which the Submitters raise to be beyond the scope of
vided for in the [Federal Government's] technical ecological standards and regulations
must be subject to a prior authorization from the Federal Government or the state and
local agencies." Ecology Law, supra note 99, art. 28.








Article 14 and that the language of Article 14 does not permit
the Agreement to be applied retroactively. 1
42
Mexico also argues that the Submitters failed to provide re-
liable evidence that demonstrates the character of the organiza-
tions they purport to represent.143 Mexico further contends that
the Submitters failed to demonstrate that their organizations
have suffered direct harm as a consequence of the acts alleged in
the submission.144 Mexico additionally asserts the Submitters
have not exhausted remedies available under Mexican law and
that the submission does not further the objectives of the
Agreement.
In considering the allegations raised in the submission,
Mexico states that the on-shore activities represent distinct proj-
ects which need not be evaluated contemporaneously with the
construction of the pier, and that the construction and operation
of the pier meets all applicable EIS requirements. 145 Mexico as-
serts that in August of 1990, the authorities reviewed an EIS
denominated Muelle de Cruceros en Cozumel, Quintana Roo
(Cruise Ship Pier, Cozumel, Quintana Roo). 146 Additionally,
Mexico notes that the Secretary of Communication and Trans-
portation (SCT) "only has authorized the initiation of works re-
lating to the pier, and that the other works referenced in the
Concession will be reviewed by environmental authorities upon
authorization by the SCT."'147 Mexico maintains that the Con-
cession is not integral, or multi-activity based, in character and
that the environmental authorities will review the EISs for any
additional works only after these initial works are authorized by
SCT. 1'"
Mexico also responds that the requirement for the approval
of an EIS in the Concession for the port terminal is "subject to
various conditions established in the same Concession, and that
some of these conditions are conditions precedent to the EIS re-
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Article 14(2)(a) states that the Secretariat shall be guided by whether the
Submitters show direct harm as a consequence of the acts alleged in the submission.
Agreement, supra note 3, art. 14(2)(a).






quirement, as in the case of Condition One."'149 In other words,
Mexico asserts that Condition Five is subject to the prior fulfill-
ment of Condition One of the concession and that Condition One
has not yet been fulfilled.
Mexico questions the relevance of the second paragraph of
Article 28 of the Ecology Law, since the works at the Concession
site do not consider the "use of natural resources" as those terms
are employed in the law. 150 Mexico observes that the reference to
"natural resources" in the second paragraph of Article 28 refers
to "those works or activities which utilize animals, forest re-
sources, acquifers or the subsurface as necessary raw materials,
or which propose to directly extract such resources."'151
D. Secretariat Observations
1. Jurisdiction and Scope of Article 14
The Secretariat agreed in principle with the Mexican gov-
ernment that the Agreement did not have a retroactive effect.1
5 2
The Agreement Article 47 indicates that the countries intended
the Agreement to take effect on January 1, 1994.153 The Secre-
tariat could not discern any intentions, express or implied, con-
ferring retroactive effect on the operation of the Agreement's Ar-
ticle 14.154 In any case, the events or acts concluded prior to
January 1, 1994, may create conditions or situations that give
rise to current enforcement obligations. 155 It follows that certain
aspects of these conditions or situations may be relevant when
considering an allegation of a present, continuing failure to en-
force environmental law. 5 6 The Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties provides some basis for Mexico's assertion that the
149. Id.
150. Recommendation, supra note 1, at 2 (addressing Mexico's Response).
151. Id.
152. Indeed, finding otherwise would have contradicted the language of the Agree-
ment. Further, it would produce an absurd result. The reason the United States wanted
the Agreement was because the United States believed that Mexico was not effectively
enforcing its environmental laws. Thus, it was assumed that prior to the enactment of
the Agreement that Mexico was in violation. See Raustalia, supra note 16.
153. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 47.





Agreement should not have retroactive effect. 157 Documents
provided by the Submitters and Mexico make reference to acts
and events occurring both before and after the execution of the
Agreement in 1994.158 The materials provided regarding actions
taken after January 1, 1994, may help to identify relevant facts
and clarify whether a present failure to enforce environmental
law has occurred.159
In light of the possibility that a present duty to enforce may
originate from, in the language of the Vienna Convention, a
situation which has not ceased to exist, the Secretariat found
that the further study of this matter does not constitute retroac-
tive application of the Agreement, nor would such study contra-
vene the language of Article 14 of the Agreement. 160
2. Articles 14(1) and 14(2)
Article 14(1) of the Agreement establishes threshold re-
quirements for consideration of a submission by the Secretar-
iat.'6 ' Article 14(2) sets forth criteria to guide the Secretariat in
determining whether the submission merits requesting a re-
sponse from the Party. 16 2 The Secretariat concluded that the
Submitters complied with the procedural requirements of Article
14(l).163 The Secretariat considered that under the circum-
stances the Submitters attempted to pursue local remedies, pri-
marily by availing themselves of the denuncia popular (public
157. Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that "unless a
different intention appears from the Treaty or is otherwise established, its provisions do
not bind the party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which
ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the Treaty with respect to that
party." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, art. 28, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 339 (1980).
158. Recommendation, supra note 1, at 3.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 14.1(a), (f).
162. In deciding whether to request a response by the country, the Secretariat looks
to whether the submission alleged harm to the person or organization making the sub-
mission; whether the submission, alone or in combination with other submissions, raises
matters whose further study in this process would advance the goals of the Agreement;
whether private remedies available under the country's law have been pursued; and
whether the submission was drawn exclusively from mass media reports. Agreement,
supra note 3, art. 14(2)(a)-(d).




In considering harm, the Secretariat noted the importance
and character of the resource in question-a portion of the mag-
nificent Paradise Coral Reef located in the Caribbean waters of
Quintana Roo. 16 5 While the Secretariat recognized that the
Submitters may not have alleged the particularized, individual
harm required to acquire legal standing to bring suit in some
civil proceedings in North America, the especially public nature
of marine resources brings the Submitters within the spirit and
intent of Article 14 of the Agreement.166 The Secretariat con-
cluded, despite the complexity of the issues raised in the sub-
mission, that the further study of this matter would substan-
tially promote the objectives of the Agreement.1 67
E. Secretariat's Recommendations to Council
In accordance with Article 15(1), and considering the possi-
bility of a present failure to effectively enforce environmental
law, the Secretariat recommended to Council that a factual rec-
ord be prepared. 168 The preparation of a factual record will shed
light on both the Submitters' allegations of nonenforcement and
the government of Mexico's important contentions in this mat-
ter. 16 9 The Secretariat states that the preparation of a factual
record in this matter will promote the objectives stated in Article
1(g) and (f) of the Agreement. 170
A factual record will consider all of the information relevant




167. Specifically, Article l(a), (d), (f) and (g) are applicable. Article I provides that it
is the objective of the Agreement to "foster the protection and improvement of the envi-
ronment in the territories of the Parties for the well-being of present and future genera-
tions ... support the environmental goals and objectives of the NAFTA ... strengthen co-
operation on the development and improvement of environmental laws, regulations,
procedures, policies and practices ... [and] enhance compliance with, and enforcement of,
environmental laws and regulations." Agreement, supra note 3, art. 1(a), (d), (f), (g).
168. Recommendation, supra note 1, at 3.
169. Id.
170. These objectives include "enhanc[ing] compliance with, and enforcement of, en-
vironmental laws and regulations [and] strengthen[ing] cooperation on the development
and improvement of environmental laws, regulations, procedures, policies and practices."
Agreement, supra note 3, art. 1(g), (f).
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conduct in not requiring the submission of an EIS on the totality
of works contemplated in the Cozumel Port Terminal project
constitutes a failure to enforce existing law. 171 These considera-
tions, for the most part, turn on facts relating to the definition of
a "port terminal" under the Law of Ports and the relevance of
this issue to the matter under consideration, the extent to which
the project or projects have been "authorized," and the facts
relative to the documentation generated after January 1, 1994.172
The Secretariat does not recommend that the Commission
examine acts or conduct, which occurred prior to the entering
into force of the Agreement, for the purposes of evaluating any
alleged failures to enforce law at that time, including, for exam-
ple, the EIS prepared in 1990 for the Cozumel pier.
173
VII. ANALYSIS OF THE SECRETARIAT'S DECISION
A. Standing
One of Mexico's principle defenses is that the Submitters do
not have standing because they have not demonstrated that they
have suffered any direct injury as a result of the act about which
they have made a submission-namely, the failure to file an EIS
in conjunction with the construction on the Cozumel pier.174 The
Agreement does not use the term "standing," but rather estab-
lishes two principles for the Secretariat to employ in determining
whether to compile a factual record. First, the Agreement allows
citizens who reside in the offending nation's territory to institute
an action with the Secretariat. 175 In addition, the Agreement
states that the Secretariat should be guided by whether the
submission alleges harm and furthers the goals of the Agree-
ment. 176 In Cozumel, the Submitters are organizations in Mexico
and have alleged harm to the Paradise Coral Reef as a result of
the construction on Cozumel, 177 and thus, the Submitters appear
to have satisfied these requirements. The Agreement, however,
171. Recommendation, supra note 1, at 3.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. (addressing Mexico's Response).
175. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 14(1)(f).
176. Id. art. 14(2)(a), (b).
177. Recommendation, supra note 1, at 1.
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provides Mexican citizens with the amount of access to the
courts which Mexico's domestic law provides. 178 Hence, only
those persons with a legally recognized interest under Mexico's
laws have standing to make a submission against Mexico to the
Commission. Since Mexican citizens cannot bring a suit unless
they can prove direct injury and the Agreement only gives citi-
zens the access that they would have in their native court sys-
tems, the Agreement does not appear to give Mexican citizens
standing to file citizen submission if they cannot show direct in-
jury to themselves.
The Mexican Constitution itself appears to present legal ob-
stacles to the ability of NGOs to sustain citizen suits. The Mexi-
can Constitution uses the term "injured party" in cases in which
an individual sues the government. 179 Mexican cases define an
"injured party" as one "who suffers a direct lesion in their legal
interest, in their person or in their patrimony, by any law or act
of authority." 80 The Mexican Supreme Court of Justice has
stated that its country's legal system "does not accept a citizen
suit system," where the individual has not suffered a direct in-
jury. 81 In sum, both Mexican case law and Constitution appear
to prohibit citizen suits due to the requirement that private par-
ties bringing actions against the government must demonstrate
that they have been directly injured. 
8 2
The public denunciation may prove to be a more successful
method for the Submitters, and NGOs generally, to establish
standing. The public denunciation, which the Ecology Law intro-
duced into the Mexican legal system, is similar to the U.S. envi-
ronmental citizen suit in that it provides Mexican citizens with
the opportunity to inform the appropriate governmental author-
ity of any act or omission which violates provisions of the Ecology
Law or other environmental regulations. 83 The power to inform
178. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 6(2). "Each Party shall ensure that persons with
a legally recognized interest under its law in a particular matter have appropriate access
to administrative, quasi-judicial or judicial proceedings for the enforcement of the Party's
environmental laws and regulations." Id.
179. THE MEXICAN CONSTITUTION OF 1917 COMPARED WITH THE CONSTITUTION OF
1857, at 81 (H.N. Branch trans., 1926). The Mexican Constitution makes this prosecuto-
rial requirement in article 107(I). Id.
180. Carl E. Koller Lucio, The Regulation of Hazardous Substances in Mexican Law,
5 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 95, 115 (1995).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Ecology Law, supra note 99, art. 189.
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the government is, of course, not equivalent to the right to sue
because the government can simply ignore the citizen's informa-
tion. The right to make a public denunciation, however, may be
sufficient to create standing for the Submitters and NGOs. The
structure of the citizen access provision of the Agreement may
actually share more procedural similarities with the Mexican
public denunciation than with the U.S. citizen suits. The es-
sence of the Agreement is that citizens may make submissions,
but not obtain damages. Both proceedings address failure to en-
force, but do not appear to require that the citizens show a direct
injury in order to have standing. Thus, the public denunciation
appears to satisfy the Agreement's requirement that the submit-
ters reside in the offending nation's territory and alleges harm
while furthering the Agreement's goals, thus creating standing
for Mexican citizens who wish to present submissions to the
Commission.
In Cozumel, the Mexican government argues that the NGOs
have not alleged any particularized harm. 8 4 If the Commission
accepts this argument, and summarily dismisses the case on the
procedural ground of standing, it will deal a deadly blow to fu-
ture citizens' submissions under the Agreement. The Agreement
provides for neither attorney's fees nor damages for the injured
party. Indeed, while the Commission may assess fines, the value
of the fines would be primarily symbolic. Thus, the Agreement's
citizen submission process may discourage private citizen claims
because the process allows citizens to make submissions, but
does not provide citizens with any incentive to make them be-
cause neither attorney fees nor damages will be awarded. There-
fore, unless the injured party is wealthy and willing to pursue
the claim on principle alone, no one except a citizen's group
(which would probably have no direct injury) could present a
submission to the Commission. 8 5
184. Recommendation, supra note 1, at 2.
185. The citizen suit sections of the U.S. environmental legislation of the 1970s, in-
cluding the Clean Air Act, were developed to remedy the government's failure to enforce.
MILLER, supra note 55, at 4. Congress believed that citizens suits would either encourage
government enforcement or would, at least, provide an alternative means of enforcement.
Id. To further this end, the citizen suit sections allow the court to award costs, including
reasonable attorney's fees, to any party. Id. at 9.
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B. Exhausting Domestic Legal Options
In Cozumel, the Mexican government also argues that the
Submitters' claim-that the Mexican government is not enforc-
ing the Ecology Law's EIS requirement-is one which the Sub-
mitters have the legal right to bring in the Mexican courts to
raise the same issues and attempt to obtain a remedy.1
86 How-
ever, by presenting the submission to the Commission, the
Submitters have already brought the matter to the Mexican gov-
ernment's attention. The Mexican government presumably re-
viewed the matter in the process of responding to the Commis-
sion. The Mexican government to date, however, has chosen not
to remedy the situation. Thus, it is difficult to perceive any jus-
tification for the view that the Mexican government's reaction
would be any different if the matter were processed in the Mexi-
can court system. 187 One rationale for including the "failure to
enforce" provision in the Agreement is to encourage citizens to
spotlight a country's practice of failure to enforce environmental
laws which are prevalent throughout that country. Further, it is
far from clear that the Submitters could bring a case in a Mexi-
can court which would address the legal issues which arise in
Cozumel. Indeed, Mexico asserts that the Submitters do not
have standing to sue under Mexican law. Thus, the Mexican
government's argument that the Submitters do not have stand-
ing is a strong refutation to the argument that Submitters
should file a claim in Mexican court. 1
88
C. Sovereignty
The Agreement's critics suggest that an international body
which scrutinizes a country's performance in enforcing its own
laws leads to some potentially perplexing problems. First, an in-
186. Recommendation, supra note 1, at 2.
187. In addition, no provision in the Agreement requires that the matter be brought
in the country's court prior to filing with the Commission. If the matter went through
the domestic courts, it is likely that the Commission would never handle any cases be-
cause, by the time the submitters exhaust their domestic remedies, the case would be
moot.
188. It is noteworthy that the Commission has previously rejected cases which were
pending in domestic courts. The Secretariat, pursuant to Article 14(3)(a), recently de-
clined to review a petition because the case was pending in the courts of another country.
The Aage Tottrup Submission, Submission No. SEM-69-002 (Mar. 28, 1996), available on
the Commission Web Site, supra note 1.
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ternational entity which attempts to evaluate another country's
laws and determine whether they are being sufficiently enforced
may encounter difficulty in interpretation and judgment; how-
ever, this argument is not particularly powerful. Since most of
Mexico's environmental laws were patterned after U.S. laws that
now have some precedent behind them, the Commission's task to
evaluate failure to effectively enforce will be easier than these
critics suggest.
Second, the critics suggest that the country's representative,
from whom the other Commission members may seek guidance,
may have a strong political interest in the outcome and will not
necessarily contribute impartial legal input. An alternative ex-
planation is that, by putting the Commission on a short political
leash, the countries have made themselves fully accountable for
the successes and the failures of the Commission.
8 9
Third, the Agreement provision that bestows NGOs with the
right to present submissions against a country which is failing to
enforce its laws was apparently drafted in part with the as-
sumption that it would be less intrusive to national sovereignty
if the focus was on the country's own laws instead of an agreed
upon international standard. Instead, the countries have created
an international entity which examines the enforcement and the
laws of the country in question to determine whether the country
is effectively enforcing its environmental laws. The critics argue
that in practice this may prove to be more intrusive than estab-
lishing a standard for all of the countries to maintain. By creat-
ing a system which appears desirable because of its flexibility,
the countries have chosen to defer the task of setting environ-
mental standards to a later time. The results of submissions to
the Commission may shape Mexico's enforcement priorities. 190
This fear will probably not be actualized. Cozumel is the first of
only two submissions regarding Mexico to date.' 9 ' Unless there
is an enormous change in this trend, there will not be enough
189. JOHNSON & BEAUUiEU, supra note 98, at 161.
190. The Mexican government may capitulate to United States demands for im-
proved enforcement of particular environmental laws. In this scenario, a foreign gov-
ernment would be shaping Mexico's domestic environmental policy. The Agreement
would be the impetus for undermining the very sovereignty it was drafted to protect. See
Agreement, supra note 3, art. 3.
191. The reason for the lack of Mexican submissions may be that potential submit-
ters are awaiting the outcome of Cozumel before they invest the resources necessary to
file a submission with the Commission.
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Commission decisions to impact Mexico's overall environmental
enforcement. Further, the problem of defining and evaluating
"effective enforcement" has not arisen in Cozumel thus far,
rather, the Secretariat in its recommendation adroitly addressed
the few issues involving Mexican law which have arisen, princi-
pally in its review of the Ecology Law.
D. Procedural Obstacles
Some commentators have stated that the Agreement's dis-
pute resolution structure contains many procedural obstacles for
the private citizen or NGO that brings a claim that a country is
failing to enforce its environmental laws.192 As in all NGO sub-
missions to the Commission, the Submitters had to overcome
several procedural impediments to get a record submitted to the
Council. First, the Submitters had to persuade the Secretariat
that the submission deserved to be investigated.193 Second, the
submission had to appear to be aimed at promoting enforcement
rather than harassing industry. 194 Third, the Submitters had to
first seek domestic remedies. 195 Fourth, the Submitters had to
convince at least two-thirds of the Council to direct the Secretar-
iat to compile a Factual Record on the submission.196 In
Cozumel, the Submitters successfully cleared all of these hur-
dies.
Another hurdle can be found in the fact that a submitter's
right to present a submission to the Secretariat is limited in that
the best possible result is that the Secretariat will compile and
submit a factual record to the Council. The Secretariat has dem-
onstrated in its disposition of Cozumel that it is willing, in com-
pelling circumstances, to compile a factual record to submit to
the Council. In addition, a two-thirds vote of the Council is re-
quired to make the factual record public. Without this vote, not
even the submitter will have access to the factual record. The
Council was intended to be an independent entity which serves
an important duty to the NAFTA countries. Thus, it stands to
reason that in instances where the Secretariat finds that a
192. Patton, supra note 22, at 112.
193. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 14(2).
194. Id. art. 14(1)(d).
195. Id. art. 14(2)(b).
196. Id. art. 15(2).
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Submitter's claims are sufficiently important to compel the
compilation of a factual record, that the Council will make its
evaluation public, or proffer some very good reasons to explain
its decision not to do so.
E. Retroactivity
The retroactivity issue is one which may become more easily
resolved with the passage of time and as fewer citizen submis-
sions are presented which involve events that occurred prior to
the enactment of the Agreement. In the interim, however, the
retroactivity issue may arise in many citizen submissions. Ret-
roactivity appears to be an issue which is relatively easy to re-
solve. As the Secretariat correctly observes, events or acts that
occurred "prior to January 1, 1994, may create conditions for
situation.. .which give rise to current enforcement obligations."
197
The Secretariat's resolution of the retroactivity issue demon-
strates a sensitivity to the particular facts of Cozumel. The ret-
roactivity issue could have provided the Secretariat with a con-
venient way to resolve the matter in favor of the Mexican
government. The Secretariat chose not to follow this path, but
rather, permitted review of the submission and compilation of
the factual record with reference to the events that occurred af-
ter January 1, 1994, without unfairly penalizing the Mexican
government for any events which occurred prior to January 1,
1994.
F. Deferring to the Country's Rational Allocation
Of Resources
The Commission can grant an exception for a country's fail-
ure to "effectively enforce" if the failure to comply "reflects a rea-
sonable exercise of discretion or results from bona fide decisions
to allocate resources... determined to have higher priorities." 198 If
a country asserts that its failure to enforce is a reasonable exer-
cise of its discretion, then a challenge may be inappropriate.
Furthermore, the offending country may avoid a challenge if it
demonstrates that its resources are better used for other inter-
197. Recommendation, supra note 1, at 3.
198. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 45(1)(a).
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ests. This exception for a "bona fide resource allocation deci-
sion199 was seen as one of Mexico's strongest arguments for
failing to enforce its environmental laws. 20 0 To date, however,
Mexico has not raised this exception as a defense in Cozumel.
Another important nuance in the "failure to effectively en-
force" determination involves recent changes in the severity of
the Ecology Law's EIS requirement. Mexico's Environmental
Ministry published new rules, appearing on October 23, 1995, in
the Diario Oficial, which allow construction companies to file
simplified "preventive reports" rather than an EIS in an effort to
eliminate bureaucratic obstacles to economic growth.201 This
change is apparently in response to companies which have com-
plained that the EIS requirement tends to punish those compa-
nies which comply with the requirement, while companies which
do not comply run only a minimal risk of sanctions because en-
forcement is so remiss.20 2 The Mexican government acknowl-
edged the previous policy's failure by stating that the rule
changes were part of "a program of deregulation and adminis-
trative simplification" which was designed to improve effi-
ciency. 203 According to official estimates, an average of 1200
EISs are submitted each year, creating a backlog of projects and
year-long delays in the approval process.2
°4
It clearly appears from these facts that the Mexican gov-
ernment is failing to effectively enforce the Ecology Law's EIS
requirement. First, the Mexican government has acknowledged
that the EIS program is a failure. 20 5 Second, the official esti-
mates that a mere 1200 EISs are filed each year indicate that
many companies which should be filing EISs are not doing so.
The perception of the companies that comply with the EIS re-
quirement also compel this conclusion.
199. Id. art 45(1)(b).
200. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
201. These preventive reports can be as brief as a few pages and contain a much
smaller range of information than the EIS which can reach more than 100 pages. Re-
quirement for Complete Impact Studies Lifted for Companies Doing Construction, 18 Int'l
Env't Rep. (BNA) 832 (1995) [hereinafter Requirement for Complete Impact Studies].
202. Id. But see Compliance with Environmental Regulations Gaining Importance
For Mexican Government, 18 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 729 (1995).
203. Requirement for Complete Impact Studies, supra note 201-
204. Draft Standards Would Allow Some Projects to Bypass EIS if Certain Criteria
are Met, 19 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 962 (1996).
205. Requirement for Complete Impact Studies, supra note 201.
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The maquiladoras are another example of the Mexican gov-
ernment's failure to require the filing of EISs. Despite aware-
ness of the pollution problem which the maquiladoras are caus-
ing, none of the six U.S.-owned maquiladoras that were




In sum, both the lack of EIS filings for construction projects and
the maquiladoras tend to demonstrate that Mexico is not effec-
tively enforcing the Ecology Law's EIS requirement.
An important aspect of Cozumel as it will shape future
submissions is the evolving definition of "failure to effectively en-
force." The Submitters, the Mexican government, nor the Secre-
tariat have indicated that the phrase should be interpreted in a
narrow sense so as to require the Submitters to demonstrate a
pattern of enforcement violations. 207 Indeed, the Submission,
Response, and Recommendation make reference to the particular
facts in Cozumel. It is more difficult to prove the occurrence of a
single event than it is to prove a pattern of events. Thus, if
Cozumel stands for the proposition that the submitter merely
needs to prove the occurrence of a single event, NGOs in Mexico
will have acquired a considerable amount of influence over Mexi-
can environmental enforcement. If used in a constructive way,
Mexican NGOs will be able to highlight Mexico's most pressing
problems and may be able to receive some relief.
VIII. A VIEW TOWARD THE FUTURE
A. Is The Focus on Enforcement Proper?
Some critics of the Agreement make a two-fold argument
that the Agreement places undue emphasis on the enforcement
of environmental laws. First, the critics claim that it is unreal-
istic to expect Mexico to be able to implement an environmental
enforcement program comparable to that of the United States
206. James E. Bailey, Free Trade and the Environment-Can NAFTA Reconcile The
Irreconcilable? 8 AM. U. J. INV'L L. & POL'Y 839, 865 (1993).
207. This issue is not, however, completely resolved. It remains to be seen how the




due to the disparities in wealth between the two countries. 208
Second, the critics assert that a powerful environmental en-
forcement program like that in the United States may not be the
most advantageous allocation of Mexico's modest resources 209 be-
cause environmental enforcement is expensive and will not, in
and of itself, improve Mexico's environment or human health.2 10
Instead, enforcement only indirectly improves the environment
and human health if enforcement fosters compliance. 211 The
critics contend that overly emphasizing enforcement may lead to
the misallocation of Mexico's scarce environmental resources. 212
The critics also argue that Mexico must first develop a basic en-
vironmental infrastructure before environmental enforcement
expenditures can yield marginal environmental benefits.
First, this argument presupposes that enforcement is ex-
pensive, but does not lead to improvement. This argument ig-
nores the deterrent value of enforcement. If environmental laws
are rigorously enforced to the extent that they deter environ-
mental damage, emphasizing enforcement may prove to be more
effective than emphasizing infrastructure.
Second, the Agreement's enforcement provisions provide a
strong refutation to these arguments. The Agreement gives the
Council the power to spend any imposed fine "to improve the
environment or environmental law enforcement" in the punished
country.213 At first glance this appears to be a peculiar form of
punishment because the money never leaves the borders of the
punished country. However, this provision may work to allow
the Commission to highlight enforcement problems but not in-
fringe on the country's sovereignty. Provided that the Commis-
sion directs the money to be spent in a rational manner, this
provision may advance environmental improvement first, in
principle, by embarrassing both the country that does not en-
force its laws and the private party which breaks the laws and,
second, in deed, by directing funds towards improving the envi-
ronment in the punished country.
208. For a general discussion on the rational allocation of Mexico's resources toward
the improvement of environmental performance, see Knight, supra note 41; Kublicki,
supra note 13.
209. Knight, supra note 41, at 629.
210. Kublicki, supra note 13, at 115.
211. Id.
212. Knight, supra note 41, at 620.
213. Agreement, supra note 3, Annex 34(3).
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B. Potential Consequences Following the
Resolution of Cozumel
Cozumel will prove to be important because, if the Commis-
sion finds that Mexico is failing to effectively enforce the EIS re-
quirement and decides to assess a fine, the principle of abiding
by the Agreement will be the sole motivation for the United
States and Canada to support the Commission's decision. The
issues raised in Cozumel have little to do with NAFTA's primary
subject-free trade among the United States, Canada, and Mex-
ico. The subject of Cozumel is also local in nature. There is little
indication that any occurrences complained of in Cozumel will
result in any adverse environmental impact outside of Mexico.
In addition, the conduct about which the Submitters are com-
plaining-the construction-may not be sufficient to outrage the
United States or Canada so as to compel either country to take
decisive action, diplomatic or otherwise. The Submitters do not
contend that the construction is creating any health or safety
hazards. Instead, the complaint is essentially that in construct-
ing the port to develop its tourism industry, Mexico is destroying
one natural resource that makes the area attractive to tourism
in the first place-namely, the Paradise Coral Reef. In this light,
it appears unlikely that the United States or Canada would im-
pose sanctions upon Mexico as a result of Cozumel. Thus, the
United States and Canada will be acting primarily on principle if
either country takes any action in procuring Mexico's obedience
to the terms of the Agreement should Mexico prove to be recalci-
trant.
If the Commission finds that Mexico is not enforcing its own
regulations, Mexico has three options. One option is for Mexico
to do nothing; another is for Mexico to change or repeal its cur-
rent laws so that businesses can more easily comply with them.
Exercising these options may lead to domestic political fallout
and possibly a response by the other two NAFTA countries.
These are extreme options, and Mexico will probably be hesitant
to choose either of these options because they could cause an
equally extreme reaction from the United States and Canada.
Another option is for Mexico to attempt to enforce its own
laws and regulations more vigorously. Mexico may be reluctant
to pursue such enforcement out of fear that international busi-
nesses may decide against investing or locating in Mexico. How-
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ever, access to the U.S. market and the other benefits of NAFTA
membership will probably prove to be more important to invest-
ment decisions, and, in the end, improvements in environmental
enforcement will not deter a great deal of foreign investment.
IX. CONCLUSION
The critics may be setting unrealistic standards for the
Agreement and the Commission. The NAFTA countries could
not have enacted any international agreement that would lead to
Mexico's becoming an environmental panacea immediately. The
environmentalists' fears of industrial flight from the United
States to Mexican pollution havens demonstrate that a primary
purpose of the Agreement was to ensure that NAFTA-induced
growth would not cause an equivalent decline in the Mexican
environment. If the Agreement is effective in preventing or
eliminating the decline in the Mexican environment that accom-
panies NAFTA's industrial growth, then the Agreement is serv-
ing this purpose. In other words, the Agreement need not lead to
a Mexican environmental panacea, but rather it merely needs to
lead to environmental improvements that correspond to the in-
dustrial growth NAFTA caused in order to be declared a success
under the standard that the environmentalists set forth.
The critics' argument that the phrase "failure to effectively
enforce" will prove to be ineffective solely because of its impreci-
sion is also unpersuasive. In U.S. jurisprudence there are many
legal standards that preclude a precise meaning.214 The Agree-
ment was enacted with the knowledge that changing conditions
will often render ineffective laws that contain overly-specific lan-
guage. The NAFTA countries chose to postpone the resolution of
some difficult decisions and to defer these decisions to the
Commission for its evaluation. This choice merely underscores
the importance of the Commission's function as both factfinder
and legal analyst, but does not necessarily preclude the Com-
mission from evaluating submissions effectively. The Commis-
sion in Cozumel thoughtfully analyzed the procedural matters,
which should give observers a basis for cautious optimism.
214. For instance, determining whether an act is reasonable is the lifeblood of torts
law. Similarly, U.S. Constitutional case law has developed intricate systems for evaluat-
ing the constitutionality of certain acts even where the Constitution provides only gen-
eral guidance in making such a determination.
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While NAFTA includes general references to the commit-
ment of its members to the environment, it neither creates sub-
stantive obligations nor provides a dispute resolution process for
environmental matters. Thus, the countries cannot look to
NAFTA to provide guidance in resolving environmental disputes
among themselves. Instead, the Agreement addresses such dis-
putes. The fact that a violation of the Agreement does not lead
to expulsion from NAFTA may not prove to be particularly im-
portant. The Agreement also contains a monetary assessment
provision that is significant because of its symbolic power and
because it promotes environmental improvements. While the
threat that NAFTA membership could be taken away could have
been useful in giving the Agreement greater strength in en-
forcement, it is not necessary and, indeed, would contradict
NAFTA's primary importance of promoting free trade as taking
away NAFTA's benefits would be tantamount to re-instituting
the trade barriers which existed prior to its enactment.
The Commission's analysis of the standing and retroactivity
issues is of primary importance in its disposition of Cozumel.
Mexican citizens do not enjoy considerable access to the Mexican
courts to challenge government actions and numerous obstacles
exist for Mexico's NGOs. In spite of these legal obstacles, the
Commission did not require the Submitters to show direct injury
to acquire standing. Thus, it appears that the Commission
broadened the scope of standing for the Submitters and gave the
Submitters even more leeway than the U.S. courts have afforded
U.S. NGOs. The Commission's standing decision is encouraging
for the prospects of NGOs' future submission to the Commission.
The Commission's refusal to dismiss the submission on the
ground of failure to allege direct injury will probably encourage
other Mexican NGOs to file submissions.
The Commission's treatment of the retroactivity issue is also
very encouraging for future NGO submissions. Because the
Agreement's enactment is still part of the recent past, the retro-
activity issue may present itself in other submissions in the near
future. It was, therefore, extremely important that the Com-
mission resolve the issue in a manner which did not unnecessar-
ily discourage future submissions. The Commission should not
allow a country to be excused from punishment for lax enforce-
ment solely because some events occurred prior to the Agree-
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ment's enactment. Additionally, the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties dictates that the Commission should not evalu-
ate events that occurred prior to the enactment of the Agree-
ment. The Commission was conscious of this dilemma and al-
lowed the submission to proceed without evaluating any events
that occurred prior to the Agreement's enactment. In so doing,
the Commission was able to satisfy both concerns.
Since Cozumel has not yet been decided in its entirety, a fi-
nal analysis is impossible at this point. However, it is apparent
at this preliminary stage of the proceeding that many of the con-
cerns of environmentalists and other critics of the Agreement
215
have not been actualized in this particular case. In particular,
the Commission has not given the Agreement a self-defeating,
draconian interpretation, precluding objective substantive anal-
ysis for serious citizens' environmental claims. Instead, the na-
ture of the proceedings to date indicate that the Agreement's
citizen petition process will prove to be a workable mechanism.
None of the environmentalists and critics' concerns and fears
have precluded the Commission from proceeding to a conclusion
on the merits despite the difficult legal and political setting in
which Cozumel arose.
DAVID G. SCHILLER*
215. In particular, Mexico did not argue that the decision not to require the filing of
an EIS was due to the reasonable allocation of its resources. See supra Part VII.F.
* J.D. Candidate 1998, University of Miami School of Law. The author thanks
Professor Richard L. Williamson for his insights and guidance. The author also wishes to
thank his parents for their unwavering love and support.
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